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FOURTH AMENDMENT 
FINALITY 
by John R. Pagan 
For a variety of reasons, many peo-
ple prefer to litigate Issues arising 
under the United States Constitution In 
federal rather than state court.1 When 
the state prosecutes someone, he sel-
dom has access to a federal forum In 
the first Instance. He must raise his 
constitutional claim In state court Ini-
tially and then, If the state trial and ap-
pellate tribunals rule against him, try to 
relltlgate the question in U.S. district 
court through a habeas corpus action 
brought under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 or a 
civil rights suit filed pursuant to 42 
U.S.C. § 1983. Due to the size of Its 
caseload and other Institutional con-
straints, the U.S. Supreme Court can 
review relatively few state convictions. 
Consequently, any diminution of the 
district courts' power to use §§ 2254 
and 1983 as vehicles for re-examining 
Issues previously adjudicated by state 
courts Increases commensurately the 
extent to which state judges have the 
final say on matters of constitutional 
Interpretation and application. 
Barriers to Relltlgatlon 
Culminating a process begun In 
Stone v. Powell,• the Supreme Court 
In Allen v. McCurry' virtually elimi-
nated the district courts ~uthorlty to re-
determine questions Involving defen-
dants' rights under the Fourth Amend-
ment (as applied to the states via the 
Fourteenth Amendment). The Court In 
Allen reversed a decision of the Eighth 
Circuit- holding that a state court's de-
nial of a suppression motion should not 
be accorded collateral estoppel effect 
In a subsequent § 1983 action In fed-
eral court. McCurry was convicted of 
possession of heroin and assault with 
Intent to kill after a Missouri judge ad-
mitted Into evidence contraband 
seized during an allegedly Illegal 
search. Stone barred McCurry from re-
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litigating the Fourth Amendment ques-
tion on habeas corpus, so he tried 
another route Into the federal forum: he 
filed a million-dollar damage suit 
against the policemen who searched 
him. The Court of Appeals permitted 
the action to go forward unencumbered 
by prior state-court rulings, reasoning 
that, given Stone, "If collateral estop-
pel is to apply In § 1983 actions raising 
search and seizure claims, there will be 
no federal forum for the victim of a 
search and seizure which allegedly vio-
lates the federal constitution."• Totally 
foreclosing access to a district court 
would be Intolerable, the Eighth Circuit 
declared, "because of the special role 
of federal courts In protecting civil 
rlghts."11 
The Supreme Court squarely re-
jected the Eighth Circuit's view that 
every person asserting a federal right Is 
entitled to at least one opportunity to 
litigate In a district court. Construing § 
1983's legislative history, the Court 
concluded that when Congress passed 
the Civil Rights Act of 1871 , It meant to 
expand the federal courts' jurisdiction 
and remedial powers, not reduce state 
courts' authority to make binding inter-
pretations of the U.S. Constitution, a 
right they have enjoyed since the 
founding of the Republic.7 The Framers 
Intended state courts to be, as Henry 
Hart put It, "the primary guarantors of 
constitutional rights."• Allen Implicitly 
acknowledges that state courts can ful-
fill that responsibility effectively only If 
their judgments are granted a high de· 
gree of finality. Clearly the Court Is 
convinced that state judges possess 
the ability and willingness to perform 
the tasks assigned them by the Fram-
ers, witness Allen's citation' to the fol-
lowing passage In Stone: 
[W]e are unwilling to assume that 
there now exists a general lack of 
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appropriate sensitivity to constitu-
tional rights In the trial and appellate 
courts of the several States. State 
courts, like federal courts, have a 
constitutional obligation to 
safeguard personal liberties and to 
uphold federal law ... Moreover, the 
argument that federal judges are 
more expert In applying federal 
constitutional law Is especially 
unpersuaslve In the context of 
search-and-seizure claims, since 
they are dealt with on a dally basis 
by trial level judges In both systems. 
In sum, there Is "no Intrinsic reason 
why the fact that a man Is a federal 
judge should make him more com-
petent, or conscientious, or learned 
with respect to the [consideration of 
Fourth Amendment claims] than his 
neighbor In the state courthouse."10 
Whatever may have been true in the 
past, presumptively parity now exists 
between state and federal courts, and 
Allen requires the latter to give pre-
clusive effect to the former's Fourth 
Amendment decisions. Identical tests 
govern both modes of collateral review. 
A state prisoner may not be granted 
federal habeas corpus relief on the 
ground that evidence obtained In an 
unconstitutional search or seizure was 
introduced at his trial unless the state 
fails to provide him with "an opportunity 
for full and fair litigation" of his Fourth 
Amendment clalm.11 In the § 1983 con-
text, collateral estoppel prohibits relltl-
gatlon except "where the party against 
whom an earlier court decision Is as-
serted did not have a full and fair oppor-
tunity to litigate the claim or Issue de-
cided by the first court."12 
Preclusion-Avoidance Devices 
We must now consider the ways In 
which an artful advocate might be able 
to circumvent th~ barriers erected by 
Stone and Allen. If the state never ac-
tually presses charges against the 
search victim, he can sue for damages 
under § 1983 In either federal or state 13 
court without worrying about preclu-
sion. But If the prosecution com-
mences or appears Imminent, he has 
only a few exceedingly problematical 
alternatives. Right away he can rule out 
a damage suit In federal court because 
by the time the litigation reaches the 
judgment stage, a state judge probably 
will have long since denied his sup-
pression motion, triggering collateral 
estoppel. Instead the victim must seek 
a speedier form of relief, namely an 
Injunction or a declaratory judgment. 
Can he procure federal preemption of 
the Fourth Amendment Issue by filing 
suit In U.S. district court before a state 
judge rules on the search's legality? In 
most situations the answer surely will 
be no. Although federal courts undoub-
tedly possess the power to Interfere 
with constitutionally defective state 
prosecutions, the judicially created 
doctrine known as "Our Federalism" 
severely limits their ability to exercise 
that power. 
If the state prosecution Is already 
under way when the search victim files 
his federal complaint, he will find It al-
most impossible to get the district judge 
to hear his Fourth Amendment claim. 
Unless he can prove bad faith or other 
extraordinary circumstances, Young-
er v. Harrls14 will proscribe issuance of 
an injunction, Samuels v. Mackall 11 
will thwart declaratory relief, and Perez 
v. Ledesma11 will prohibit a suppres-
sion order. If state criminal pro-
ceedings are threatened but have not 
yet begun, the victim can seek a federal 
declaratory judgment under Steffel v. 
Thompson.17 A district-court ruling 
that the search violated the Fourth 
Amendment would have preclusive ef-
fect In a subsequent state prosecution. 
However, Hicks v. Miranda allows 
state officials to block Steffel relief by 
merely Instituting charges "before any 
proceedings of substance on the 
merits have taken place In the federal 
court."18 The only way to prevent them 
from trumping the federal suit between 
the filing of the complaint and trial on 
the merits Is to persuade the U.S. dis-
trict court to grant preliminary Injunctive 
relief, a maneuver approved In Doran 
v. Salem Inn." To qualify for Etuch re-
lief, the plaintiff must make a sofflclent 
showing both of Irreparable harm pen-
dente lite and of likelihood of ultimate 
success on the merits. Where the chal-
lenged search has already occurred, 
the Irreparable-harm requirement will 
doubtless prove extremely difficult to 
satisfy. At least In theory the opportun-
Ity to raise the Fourth Amendment 
Issue as a defense to the state prose-
cution affords the victim a wholly 
adequate remedy. Perhaps a person 
who Is engaged In a continuing course 
of conduct could qualify for preliminary 
federal relief by arguing that unless the 
district court halts the state prosecution 
and passes judgment on the search's 
validity, he will be forced to either sur-
render his freedom of action or run the 
risk of multiple prosecutions. The ar-
gument might succeed If the search 
Implicated First Amendment values, 
but the federal judge could choose 
simply to restrain future searches while 
the question of the completed con-
duct's constlt~;~tlonallty Is litigated In 
state court.20 That result would, of 
course, leave Allen's force largely un-
diminished. 
Where state-court proceedings are 
not yet pending, there exists another 
tactic the search victim might employ to 
bring his Fourth Amendment claim Into 
federal court for trial de novo: Pullman 
abstention with an England reserva-
tion. This gambit's prospects for suc-
cess are virtually nil, for It requires the 
prosecutors' active, albeit unwitting, 
cooperation. Nevertheless, it provides 
some Intellectual interest and therefore 
merits our attention. The gambit pre-
supposes this scenario: (1) for some 
reason the prosecutors are not yet In a 
position to press formal charges (e.g. 
they need to Investigate further), so 
they cannot take advantage of the 
Hicks v. Miranda 'trump'21 ; (2) the vic-
tim's federal complaint alleges a viola-
tion of state regulations as well as the 
Fourth Amendment; (3) the regula-
tions' meaning Is uncertain; and (4) an 
Interpretation in the victim's favor 
would result In suppression of the evi-
dence, mooting the federal constitu-
tional question. This situation might 
tempt prosecutors to try to shunt the 
controversy Into state court through 
Railroad Commission of Texas v. 
Pullman22 abstention, thereby fore-
stalling federal review of state or local 
policemen's Investigatory methods 
and buying themselves some extra 
time. But If the prosecutors succeed, 
theirs will have been a Pyrrhic victory, 
at least from the standpoint of Allen 
Issue preclusion. The reason Is slmplri. 
Pursuant to England v. Louisiana 
State Bd. of Medical Examiners," 
the search victim could expressly re-
serve the right to return to federal court 
for decision of the Fourth Amendment 
question If the state-law Issue were re-
solved against him. In that event, any 
purported decision of federal law by the 
state court would not be given collat-
eral estoppel effect In a subsequent 
federal action. This Is a rather exotic 
end-run around Allen, to be sure, but 
footnote 1724 of that opinion hints that It 
just might work. 
Conclusion 
Notwithstanding the preclusion-
avoidance devices canvassed above, 
the combined effect of Allen v. 
McCurry, Stone v. Powell, and the 
Younger v. Harris line of cases Is to 
unify and streamline Fourth Amend-
ment adjudication. Persons accused of 
violating state law are now entitled to 
no more than one full and fair hearing 
on search and seizure questions, sub-
ject only to review by higher state tri-
bunals and, ultimately, the Supreme 
Court. The U.S. district court serves a 
procedural backstop function, Its role 
limited to ensuring that the defendant 
received an adequate opportunity to 
litigate In state court. 
I, for one, applaud these develop-
ments and would like to see the finality 
principle fully implemented in areas 
besides the Fourth Amendment.Z5 Re-
dundancy wastes scarce judicial re-
sources and creates intergovern-
mental friction while yielding few, If any, 
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benefits. The best way to minimize 
constitutional error is not for federal 
judges to second-guess their state 
counterparts, but rather for states to 
take the initiative and Improve trial and 
appellate procedures so their courts 
can become more hospitable fora for 
adjudicating federal rights. Let us hope 
that Allen's reaffirmation and rein-
forcement of the state judiciaries' vital 
role in the federal system will spur 
further reform. 
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